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Abstract
Existing real options literature provides relatively little insight into the
impact of structural changes of the economic environment on the invest-
ment decision of the …rm. We propose a method to model the impact of
a policy change on investment behavior in which, contrary to the earlier
models based on Poisson processes, uncertainty concerning the moment
of the change can be explicitly accounted for. Moreover, probabilities of
the change depend on the state of the dynamic system, what ensures the
consistency of the action of the policy maker. We model the policy change
as an upward jump in the (net) investment cost, which is, for instance,
caused by a reduction in the investment tax credit. The …rm has an in-
complete information concerning the trigger value of the process for which
the jump occurs. We derive the optimal investment rule maximizing the
value of the …rm. It is shown that the impact of trigger value uncertainty
is non-monotonic: the investment threshold decreases with the trigger
value uncertainty for low levels of uncertainty, while the reverse is true
for high uncertainty levels. Finally, we present policy implications for the
authority that result from the …rm’s value-maximizing behavior.
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11 Introduction
Corporate investment opportunities may be represented as a set of (real)
options to acquire productive assets. In the literature it is widely assumed
that the present values of cash ‡ows generated by these assets are uncertain
and their evolution can be described by a stochastic process. Consequently, an
appropriate identi…cation of the optimal exercise strategies for the real options
plays a crucial role in capital budgeting and in the maximization of a …rm’s value
(cf. Lander and Pinches [13]). So far, existing real options literature provides
relatively little insight into the impact of structural changes of the economic
environment on the investment decision of the …rm. We propose a method to
model such changes.
The modern theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck
[6]) provides tools for evaluating the …rm’s investment opportunities and deter-
mining the value-maximizing investment rules. Within this theory, mainly use
is made of two stochastic processes. The …rst process is called Brownian motion,
or Wiener process, which can be applied to cases where an economic variable is
continuous over time. Often, however, it is more realistic to model an economic
variable as a process that makes infrequent but discrete jumps. Then use is
made of Poisson (jump) processes. Under Poisson processes jumps always occur
with a constant probability. Although it is convenient to model external shocks
using a Poisson process, this technique has a major drawback. It does not allow
for modeling situations, such as a policy change, where the shock occurs under
speci…c circumstances.
We propose a new methodology that allows for modeling a structural
change occurring after passing a certain trigger by an underlying variable. As an
example consider a reduction of an investment tax credit which was previously
analyzed by Hassett and Metcalf [11] (see also Dixit and Pindyck [6], Ch. 9)
with the use of a Poisson process. Such a reduction is typically imposed by the
authority when the economy is booming and an active investment policy is no
longer needed or desired.1 Hence, the moment of the reduction should depend
on the state of the economy so that its probability should not be constant like
under a Poisson process.2
Another example, where it is realistic to assume that the occurrence of
the shock depends on the state of the economy, is a foreign direct investment
(FDI) decision of a …rm that is aiming at the purchase of a local company from
the government of a developing country (see Smets [18] and Cherian and Perotti
[3] for a discussion of the e¤ects of strategic interactions and political risk). The
government observes the performance of the local company and may decide to
1For example, after a period of fast economic growth, in 1999 Ireland announced an end to
its special 10% rate for new foreign manufacturing and …nancial investors as one of the means
to avoid ”overheating” of the economy.
2Hassett and Metcalf [11] try to correct this by letting the arrival rate depend on the
output price. But still it is then possible that an investment subsidy is reduced for low output
prices, while the subsidy was maintained under high output prices. This kind of inconsistency
in the authority’s behavior is no longer possible under our approach.
2increase the o¤ering price for this company after it obtains higher pro…ts.3
In the paper we introduce a possibility of an upward jump in the (net)
investment cost. This jump will, for instance, be caused by a reduction of an
investment tax credit. Rather than letting the probability of the jump to be
constant, we propose to let the jump occur at the moment that an underlying
variable reaches a certain trigger. Here, the underlying variable is the value
of the investment project. The …rm is not aware of the exact value of the
trigger but it knows the probability distribution of the trigger instead. In the
investment credit example, this corresponds to the situation where the …rm has
incomplete information about the authority’s tax strategy. Taking into account
consistent government behavior, the …rm knows that a jump will not occur as
long as the current value of the variable remains below the maximum that this
variable has attained in the past. When the underlying variable reaches a new
maximum and the jump does still not occur, the …rm updates its conjecture
about the value of the barrier.
Consequently, our objective is to determine the optimal timing of an
irreversible investment when the investment cost is subject to change and the
…rm has incomplete information about the moment of the change. It is clear
that the value of the project drops to zero at the moment that the investment
cost jumps to in…nity. However, we mainly consider scenarios where the cost
of investment is still …nite after the upward jump occurred. In this way this
work generalizes Lambrecht and Perraudin [12] , Schwartz and Moon [17], and
Berrada [2], where the value of the project drops to zero at the unknown point
of time.
Our main results are the following. We derive an equation that implic-
itly determines the value of the project at which the …rm is indi¤erent between
investing and refraining from the investment. This value is the optimal invest-
ment threshold and it is shown that this threshold is decreasing in the hazard
rate of the cost-increase trigger. For the most frequently used density functions
it holds that, for a given value of the project, the hazard rate …rst increases
and then decreases with trigger value uncertainty. This leads to the conclusion
that the investment threshold decreases with the trigger value uncertainty when
the uncertainty is low, while it increases with uncertainty for high uncertainty
levels. Hence, for a policy maker interested in accelerating investment, an op-
timal level of uncertainty can be identi…ed which is the level corresponding to
3The same idea can also be applied within the topic of technology adoption. In Farzin et
al. [7] the arrival of a more e¢cient technology satis…es a Poisson process (this assumption
is also adopted by Baudry [1] where the new technology has the advantage of being less
polluting, and by Mauer and Ott [14] where maintenance and operation cost are lowered after
the technological breakthrough). This way of modeling is satisfactory only when the …rm has
no insight at all in the innovation process of new technologies. If, instead, the …rm could
observe progress (but has no perfect information), a way to model it is to introduce a variable
that stands for the state of technological progress. The …rm is able to observe perfectly the
realizations of this variable. As soon as the state of technological progress hits a certain
barrier, which is ex ante unknown to the …rm, the new technology is invented. This approach
is similar to the one in Grenadier and Weiss [8] but there it was assumed that the value of
the barrier is known beforehand.
3the minimal investment threshold.
2 Value Maximizing Investment Rule
We apply the value-maximization criterion to determine the optimal invest-
ment rule of the …rm. First, we consider the basic model of investment under
uncertainty with no change in the investment cost. Subsequently, we develop a
model which allows for an increase in the investment cost after the value of the
project reaches a certain trigger.
2.1 Basic Model
We start by considering the basic model of investment under uncertainty.
The model was …rst developed by McDonald and Siegel [15] and is extensively
analyzed in Dixit and Pindyck [6], Ch. 5. The general problem is to …nd
the optimal timing of an irreversible investment, I, given that the value of
investment project, V , follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dVt = ®Vtdt + ¾Vtdwt: (1)
The parameter ® denotes the deterministic drift parameter, ¾ is an instanta-
neous standard deviation and dwt is an increment of a Wiener process. Within
this setting a …rm’s investment opportunity is a perpetual American option with
an exercise price equal to I and where V is the value of the underlying asset of
V .4 In our case I denotes a lump sum payment needed to undertake the project.
The …rm is assumed to be risk-neutral.5 After making the payment, the …rm
owns the project, which generates a present value of cash ‡ows V . The …rm
maximizes the expected present value of cash ‡ow by choosing the optimal V
at which the project is undertaken. A well-described procedure (see Dixit and
Pindyck [6]), involving the use of Ito’s lemma and solving a di¤erential equation
under the corresponding value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, yields




















¾2 > 1; (3)
and r is an instantaneous interest rate.6 For the value of the investment oppor-
tunity, W(V ); it holds that
W(V ) = E
￿ Z 1
Tm
Vt (r ¡ ®)e¡rtdt ¡ Ie¡rTm
¸






4To simplify notation, we skip the time subscripts whenever it does not yield ambiguity.
5Alternatively, we can apply the replicating portfolio argument.
6The problem has a …nite solution for ® < r.
4where Tm is the …rst passage time corresponding to the threshold Vm.7 By
following Dixit [4] and substituting variables, we obtain









There are two factors determining the value of the investment opportunity.
The …rst factor, Vm ¡ I, corresponds to the net payo¤ realized at the time






, allows for translating the future payo¤ from
the investment opportunity into its present value.
The value of the optimal investment threshold is positively related to the
volatility of the project’s value (the higher it is, the higher V must be reached
for the project to be undertaken) and negatively related to its growth rate.
W(V ) increases in the volatility of the value of the project (¯ is a decreasing
function of ¾ and W is decreasing in ¯) what results from the convex payo¤ of
the investment opportunity. W is increasing in the growth rate, ®, since the
e¤ective discount rate of future cash ‡ows decreases linearly in ®.
2.2 Model with Switching Cost
We introduce an upward change in the investment cost that occurs if the
project becomes more valuable.8 This change may be attributed to an action
of the authority such as reducing the investment tax credit or increasing the
o¤ering price for a privatized enterprise. Moreover, it can be a result of an
arrival of a competitive …rm o¤ering a higher bid for a particular project (as
soon as its value is su¢ciently high).
The investment cost jumps upwards at the moment that the project
value becomes su¢ciently large. In case of the investment tax credit it is no
longer needed to stimulate investment policy, in case of FDI the government
simply requires a higher price for an asset that is worth more, and in case of
a competitive …rm it holds that often potential buyers are attracted when the
project value increases.
Let us denote by V ¤ such a realization of the process for which the (net)
investment cost changes with probability 1 from Il to Ih, where Ih > Il. At this
stage we assume that Ih is deterministic. Later we consider a straightforward
extension to the stochastic case and discuss its implications. We assume that
the …rm knows only the distribution, F(V ), of the cost-increase trigger.9 The
7The expected timing of reaching the threshold can only be calculated under the condition
2® > ¾2 (cf. Harrison [9]).
8The obtained results also hold if, instead, a downward jump in V is considered.
9This assumption is consistent with Lambrecht and Perraudin [12] who analyze a duopoly
game under incomplete information. In their model the investment opportunity deteriorates
completely for some realization of the process and the …rms know only the density function
generating the arrival. In the Lambrecht and Perraudin framework the deterioration of the
investment opportunity results from a competitive entry. Our model allows for a partial
deterioration of the value of the investment opportunity what is captured by setting Ih < 1.
5key assumption here is that the distribution function governing the change is





V is the highest realization of the process so far, the cost will not
increase at any t > b t for which V (s) ￿
_
V for all s ￿ t: Hence, the probability of
the jump in investment cost is a function of V alone.
In order to restrict our analysis to the most relevant case, we impose
the following assumptions on the values of the variables used in the model:
8
> > > <
> > > :
V0 < Il; (i)









< V ¤ ¡ Il; (iv)
(6)
where V0 denotes the initial value of the project and Vh is the unconditional
optimal investment threshold corresponding to the cost Ih. The assumption (i)
means that the initial value of the project is su¢ciently low to exclude an imme-
diate investment. Violating either (ii) or (iii) would imply that the investment
would be undertaken either at a high cost or at a low cost, respectively, with
probability one.10 Finally, (iv) ensures that ex post it is never optimal to wait
with investing until the upward change in cost occurs.
2.2.1 Value of Investment Opportunity
Since the cost-increase trigger is not known beforehand, two scenarios are
possible. In the …rst scenario, the investment occurs before the change in the
price of the asset, and, in the second scenario, the investment takes place after
the upward change. Consequently, the value of the investment opportunity
re‡ects the structure of the expected payo¤s:
Ws(V;
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V ) is a conditional (on the highest realization of V ,
_
V ) probability that
the investment cost will increase after the investment is made optimally, and
Ts and Th denote …rst passage time corresponding to the optimal investment
threshold at the low and at the high cost, respectively. Their expected values
can be calculated in a similar fashion as (5). After rearranging and including
these expected values, we obtain the following maximization problem allowing
10This would degenerate the problem to the basic McDonald and Siegel [15] model.
6for …nding the optimal investment threshold:
Ws(V;
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Vs is the optimal investment threshold in case the investment takes place before
the change in cost,
_
V is the highest realization of the process so far and F(:)





is the probability that the jump in the investment cost will not occur
by the moment V is equal to Vs, given that the jump has not occurred for
V smaller than
_
V . Equation (8) is interpreted as follows: the value of the
investment opportunity is equal to the weighted average of the values of two
investment opportunities. They correspond to the investment cost Il and Ih,
respectively, given that investment is made optimally (at Vs if the price is still
equal to Il and at Vh if the upward change has already occurred).11
The value of the investment opportunity depends on the highest real-
ization of the process,
_
V . A higher
_
V (thus a one closer to Vs) implies a lower
probability of the trigger falling into the interval (
_
V ; Vs) and, as a consequence,
a higher probability of making the investment at the lower cost, Il. In order to
calculate the value of the investment opportunity, …rst we need to establish the
value of Vs by solving the maximization problem.
2.2.2 Optimal Timing of Investment
The optimal investment threshold, Vs, is determined by maximizing the
value of the investment opportunity or the RHS of the Equation (8).
Proposition 1 Under the su¢cient condition that
h0(Vs)Vs + h(Vs) ¸ 0; (11)















what directly corresponds to the result of Lambrecht and Perraudin [12]. In the other limiting
case, i.e. for Ih ! Il, the value of investment opportunity converges to
Ws(V;
_






which is the formula obtained by McDonald and Siegel [15].
7the investment is made optimally at Vs which is a solution to the following
equation:
h(Vs)V 2












1¡F(x) denotes the hazard rate.12
Proof. See Appendix.
A su¢cient condition for (11) to hold is that the hazard rate has to
be non-decreasing.13 This condition (11) is satis…ed for most of the common
density functions as, e.g., exponential, uniform and Pareto.14
3 Solution Characteristics
In this section we analyze the sensitivity of the optimal threshold with
respect to the changes in the parameters characterizing the dynamics of the
project value. Moreover, we determine the direction of the impact of the changes
in the investment costs in both scenarios. Subsequently, we examine how the
uncertainty concerning the moment of imposing the change in‡uences the …rm’s
optimal investment rule.
3.1 Changing Parameters of Investment Opportunity
We are interested in how potential changes in the characteristics of the
investment opportunity in‡uence the optimal investment rule. Therefore we
establish the sign of relationships between the value of Vs and the parameters
capturing such features of the project (via ¯) as its growth rate, ®, volatility,
¾, and the interest rate, r. Moreover, we analyze the impact of the changes in
a current investment cost, Il, as well as of a shift in the expectations about its
future value, Ih. For this purpose we formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The e¤ects on the investment threshold level of the changes in
12In our case, the hazard rate has the following interpretation. The probability of the upward
change in the investment cost during the nearest increment of the value of the project, dV ,
(given that the cost-increase has not occurred by now) is equal to the appropriate hazard rate
multiplied by the size of the value increment, i.e. to h(x;¢)dV .
13More precisely, the relevant hazard rate has to be ”not too fastly decreasing” so that the
component with a negative derivative is not greater (in absolute terms) than the value of the
function.
14In fact, the hazard rate based on the Pareto function is decreasing at an order of 1=x and
the property (11) is still met.










8Il;Ih satisfying 0 < Il < Ih; 8¯ 2 (1;r=®) if ® > 0 and 8¯ 2 (1;1) if ® ￿ 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
Consequently, the optimal threshold (ceteris paribus) increases in the
initial investment cost and decreases in the size of the potential cost-increase as
well as in the parameter ¯. The latter implies that the threshold increases with
uncertainty of the value of the project and decreases with the wedge between
interest rate and the project’s growth rate. All these results are intuitively
plausible.
3.2 Impact of Policy Change
The optimal investment rule depends not only on the characteristics of the
project itself but also on the …rm’s conjecture about the probability distribution
underlying the expected policy change. The parameters of this distribution can
be in‡uenced by actions of the authority. For instance, an information campaign
about the expected changes in investment tax credit will lead to a reduction
of the variance of the distribution underlying the value triggering the change.
Therefore, it is important to know how the changes in the uncertainty related to
the project value triggering the jump in the investment cost in‡uence the …rm’s
optimal investment rule. Knowing that the …rms are going to act optimally, the
authority can implement a desired policy, which is, for instance, accelerating the
investment expenditure by changing the level of the …rms’ uncertainty about the
tax strategy.
3.2.1 Hazard Rate
The hazard rate of the arrival of the cost-increase trigger is one of the
basic inputs for calculating the optimal investment threshold. Although it is
exogenous to the …rm, it may well be controlled by another party such as the
authority. Here, we determine the impact of its change on the …rm’s investment
rule. Later, we discuss some of the policy implications of the obtained result.
After applying the envelope theorem (see Appendix) to the LHS of (12),
we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal investment threshold is decreasing in the corre-





This result implies that an increasing risk of the switch leads to an
earlier optimal exercise. The intuition is quite simple: an increasing risk of a
partial deterioration of the investment opportunity after a small appreciation
in the project value decreases the value of waiting. Consequently, (16) implies
that for any parameter of the density function underlying the jump, denoted by








Using (17) we can establish how the hazard rate is a¤ected by changes in
the parameters of the distribution underlying the occurrence of the jump. It is
easy to show that, in the relevant interval, the hazard rate is monotonic in V ¤
which denotes the mean of the corresponding density function.15
3.2.2 Trigger Value Uncertainty
We analyze the impact of the uncertainty related to the value of the cost-
increase trigger on the optimal investment threshold. For this purpose, the
concept of a mean-preserving spread (see Rotschild and Stiglitz [16]) is ap-
plied. Following Proposition 3, we know that the optimal investment threshold
is monotonic in the hazard rate corresponding to the trigger. Hence, what is
left is to establish the sign of the relationship between the hazard rate and the
uncertainty related to the value of the trigger.
If the cost-increase trigger is known with certainty, the investment is
made optimally at an in…nitesimal instant before V ¤ is reached. At this point,
the hazard rate is zero (there is no risk that the cost increases before the optimal
threshold is reached). As the uncertainty marginally increases, the hazard rate is
a¤ected by: 1) an increase in the value of the density function, f(V ), underlying
the trigger, and 2) a change in the value of the survival function, 1 ¡ F(V ). It
is easy to verify that, for the most frequently used density functions, such as
normal, uniform, exponential and Pareto, the value of the hazard rate, for any
V 2 [V0;V ¤), …rst increases and then decreases in the mean-preserving spread.
An example for the normal density function is shown on Figure 1.16
15This property holds for the most frequently used density functions, such as normal, uni-
form, exponential and Pareto.
16Although the concepts of the mean-preserving spread and increased standard deviation
are, in general, not equivalent, they may be treated as such for the types of density functions
referred to in this paper.






















Figure 1. The relationship between the hazard rate and standard deviation of
a normal density function with a mean equal to 150. Hazard rates are plotted for
V = 100, 120 and 140.
Moreover, for each degree of the trigger value uncertainty, there exists such
a value of V < V ¤, say e V , that for V 2 [V0; e V ) the hazard rate increases, and
for V 2 (e V ;V ¤) decreases, in this uncertainty. This form of the relationship
between the hazard rate and the uncertainty implies (via Proposition 3) that
Vs decreases in the uncertainty if it falls into the interval [V0; e V ) and increases
otherwise, as depicted in Figure 2.
Vs decreases Vs increases
in uncertainty e V in uncertainty
Figure 2
Figure 2. The relationship between trigger value uncertainty and the optimal
investment threshold.
Consequently, in order to determine the sign of the e¤ect of uncertainty
on Vs, we need to establish the relative position of Vs with respect to e V . Let us
denote the standard deviation of a density function underlying the cost-increase
trigger as !. Since the expression for Vs is already known (see (12)), all we have





17Although e V (!) cannot be written explicitly in a general form, its values corresponding to
a given density function may be easily found numerically.
11For most frequently used density functions it can be shown that e V
decreases in uncertainty. For a relatively low degree of uncertainty, it holds
that Vs < e V . Since for V < e V the hazard rate increases in !, Vs is moving
to the left when the uncertainty rises. After the uncertainty reaches a critical
level, say !e, at which Vs = e V ; the hazard rate at Vs is decreasing in ! and
the optimal threshold begins to increase. This implies that optimal investment
threshold attains the minimum for ! = !e. Now, we are able to formulate the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 For density functions such that
lim
!!1f(V;¢) = 0; 8V and
f(V;¢) is unimodal,
(19)
there exists a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal investment thresh-
old and the trigger value uncertainty. At a low degree of uncertainty, the
marginal increase in uncertainty leads to an earlier optimal investment. The
reverse is true for a high degree of uncertainty. There exists a unique point !e,
such that Vs(!e) = e V (!e); which separates the areas of low and high uncertainty
levels.
Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship between the uncertainty, !, and
the optimal investment threshold.




















Figure 3. The relationship between the uncertainty, !, and the optimal investment
threshold, Vs, for di¤erent sizes of the high investment cost (Ih = 120;150 and
200). The values are calculated for a normal density function with mean 150. An
intersection of Vs and e V corresponds to the minimal investment threshold, Vs(!e).
The parameters of the underlying process are: ® = 0; r = 0:025 and ¾ = 0:1:18
18This set of parameters is used in Dixit [5], and Lambrecht and Perraudin [12] (we rescale
the investment cost with the factor 100).
12In Figure 3 it can be seen that the optimal investment threshold is …rst
decreasing and then increasing in the uncertainty concerning the value of the
trigger. The minimum is always reached when Vs(!) intersects e V (!). The
hazard rate increases in ! in the area located to the south-west from e V (!) and
decreases in the north-eastern region. The opposite holds for Vs. Moreover,
the optimal threshold is higher if the expected change in the investment cost is
smaller (cf. Proposition 2).

























Figure 4. The relationship between V and the derivative of the hazard rate with re-
spect to the trigger value uncertainty. The optimal investment thresholds for Ih = 150
and di¤erent uncertainty levels are shown on the horizontal axis (Point a corresponds
to Vs(15), b to Vs(!e = 19:26) and c to Vs(25): The values are calculated for a
normal density function with mean 150. The parameters of the underlying process
are: ® = 0; r = 0:025 and ¾ = 0:1:
In Figure 4 it can be noticed that the point, e V , at which the derivative of
the hazard rate is equal to zero moves to the left when the trigger uncertainty
increases. As long as Vs < e V , the optimal threshold also moves to the left
(cf. the location of Vs(15)). When the standard deviation is equal to 19:26, Vs
equals e V . After a further increase in the uncertainty, e V continues moving to the
left and Vs starts moving to the right (cf. Vs(25)). For a su¢ciently high degree
of uncertainty, Vs exceeds V ¤ and for the uncertainty tending to in…nity, Vs
converges to the unconditional threshold Vl:19 This fact has implications for the
optimal investment tax credit policy, discussed as an example in the subsequent
section.
19The necessary and su¢cient condition for lim
!!1Vs = Vs is lim
!!1h(Vs;¢) = 0:
134 Implications for the Investment Credit Tax
Policy






. In the example we assume that the ratio Ih
Il is predetermined
by the current amount of the tax credit (and is a priori a common knowledge).
The variables V ¤ and ! are the authority’s decision variables.
As we already know, a decrease in V ¤ results in a lower optimal thresh-
old. Consequently, in case of a single …rm a reduction in the trigger value is
going to accelerate investment. However, in case of multiple heterogenous …rms,
lowering the trigger has two opposite e¤ects. First, as in the single-…rm case,
it triggers an early investment for those …rms for which Assumption iv (6) is
still satis…ed. On the other hand, it results in the other …rms waiting longer
and investing at a high cost (if Assumption iv (6)) no longer holds). Therefore,
if the …rms are su¢ciently heterogenous, reducing V ¤ does not yield a desired
e¤ect.
Therefore, the authority may prefer to resort to another instrument,
such as !. An appropriately designed threat of abandoning the investment tax
credit can trigger an early investment (see Dixit and Pindyck [6], Ch. 9). Since
the …rm’s optimal investment threshold reaches a minimum for a certain degree
of uncertainty, !e, the objective of the authority interested in accelerating the
investment should be to set the standard deviation of the density function under-
lying the cost-increase trigger equal to !e. Such a policy allows for Assumption
iv (6) to be satis…ed for a larger fraction of …rms that in case of reducing V ¤.
Although a relatively small deviation from the optimal policy would
result in a small delay in the aggregate investment, a su¢ciently large deviation
would have much more severe adverse e¤ects. There exists a critical level of !,
say b !, above which the optimal threshold is greater than V ¤. In such a situation,
the change in the cost is occurs before the investment is made and the project
of a benchmark …rm is undertaken at Vh. Therefore, increasing ! beyond b !
leads to a discontinuous change in the investment threshold what results in a
considerable delay of the investment.20 According to Proposition 1, b ! satis…es
the following equation21
0 = h(V ¤; b !;¢)(V ¤)
2 + (¯ ¡ 1)V ¤ ¡ (V ¤h(V ¤; b !;¢) + ¯)Il ¡ (20)










If the uncertainty related to the timing of imposing the trigger for a given …rm
is higher than b !, then the optimal threshold, Vs, is larger than V ¤:
20The expected delay, ¢T,can be calculated from a direct application of the …rst passage





21Equation (20) is also satis…ed for ! = 0, since the optimal threshold in the deterministic
case is equal to V ¤.
14Consequently, the impact of uncertainty associated with the timing of





[0; b !)n!e : feasible policy,
!e : most e¤ective policy,
[b !;1) : policy resulting in the investment delay.
The threat of the increased investment cost is used as an investment stimulus
most e¤ectively when there exists a positive degree of informational noise con-
cerning the timing of imposing the measure. The level of noise corresponds to
!e. Perfect information allows investors to wait until V ¤ is reached. Excessive
noise (above b !) results in the threat of imposing the trigger being lowered too
much to trigger an early investment. As an e¤ect, the change in the cost occurs
before the investment is made. The optimal degree of uncertainty results in
the optimal investment threshold being lower than V ¤ and, at the same time,
does not excessively dilute the threat. In such a case the preemption is most
signi…cant.
5 Extension: Stochastic Jump Size
Now we introduce a stochastic size of the upward change in the investment
cost. Similarly to the previous case, the value of the investment opportunity,
Ws, re‡ects the structure of the expected payo¤s maximized with respect to
the optimal investment threshold, Vs. Allowing for a stochastic Ih, distributed
according to the cumulative density function G(Ih), the value of investment
opportunity becomes (cf. (8)):
Ws(V;
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Ih and Ih denote the lower and the higher bound of Ih, respectively. Equation
(21) is interpreted analogously to (8), and the second component is the expected
value of the option to wait after the upward switch. We prove in the Appendix
that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5 In case the size of the jump is stochastic, the optimal investment










in the expression for the optimal threshold (12).
15Formula (22) can be interpreted as a certainty equivalent of the high
investment cost.22. This allows for a relatively simple analysis of the impact on
the optimal investment timing of the uncertainty of the size of the jump.
The impact of the uncertainty concerning the size of the jump can be












since the function f(x) = xa;a < 0; is convex for all x > 0. The RHS of
Equation (23) is an inversely monotonic transformation of the expected value of
Ih. Since, by (14), @Vs
@Ih < 0; the threshold increases in I
1¡¯
h : Consequently, the
threshold is higher for LHS than for RHS. In other words, the uncertainty in the
size of the jump of the investment cost leads to the higher optimal investment
threshold.
This result may be explained in the following way. The optimal timing
is a convex function of the new investment cost, Ih. Therefore, the gains from
below average realizations of the jump are assigned a larger weight by the …rm
than the symmetric losses from above-the-average realizations. Consequently,
the …rm is going to wait longer if the realizations are random than in the case
when all of them are equal to the average.
Compared to the basic model where investment cost is constant, the
threat of an upward change in the investment cost reduces the optimal invest-
ment threshold. Now, we can see that the uncertainty in the size of the jump
mitigates this reduction of the threshold value. Again, it holds that the increased
uncertainty raises the option value of waiting.
Apart from the overall di¤erence between the uncertain and determin-
istic outcome, we are interested in a marginal impact of uncertainty on the
optimal investment strategy. In other words, we aim at establishing how the
investment threshold behaves for the di¤erent degrees of uncertainty concerning
the size of the jump. Therefore, we compare the investment triggers correspond-
ing to a relatively small and a high degree of uncertainty. For this purpose, we
use the concept of mean preserving spread (Rotschild and Stiglitz [16]). In this
setting, the e¤ect of increasing uncertainty is examined by replacing the original
random variable Ih (’low uncertainty’ case) by a new random variable Ih + »
(’high uncertainty’ case), where E[»] = 0 and ¾» 2 (0;1): By applying Jensen’s
inequality it can be proven that the expected value of a convex function (in
our case f(Ih) = I
1¡¯
h ) increases as its argument undergoes a mean preserving
spread (cf. Hartman [10]). Consequently, an increase in the uncertainty leads
to the higher expected value of I
1¡¯
h what corresponds to the lower I¤
h, and a
higher (or less distant from the basic case) investment threshold.
22Using the term certainty equivalent is a simpli…cation since the …rm is assumed to be risk-
neutral. In our sense, (22) corresponds to such a value of a certain investment cost (within
the high regime) that yields an identical optimal investment rule as when uncertain costs are
distributed according to G(IH):
16The impact on the optimal investment rule of uncertainty related to the
magnitude of the change in the cost is monotonic. Therefore, in the investment
credit example, increasing this type of uncertainty has the same e¤ect on the
investment as the reduction of the magnitude of the change. Furthermore, (13)
implies that a lower potential increase in the investment cost is associated with a
higher optimal investment threshold. Therefore, a higher degree of uncertainty
associated with the magnitude of the potential cost-increase results in a later
investment. An e¤ective policy triggering an early investment should, therefore,
be associated with minimizing the investors’ uncertainty about the size of the
expected change.
6 Conclusions
In the paper we consider an investment opportunity of a …rm. The in-
vestment cost is irreversible and subject to an increase resulting from a policy
change. The value of the cost-increase trigger is unknown to the …rm and the
…rm knows the underlying density function instead. This corresponds to the
situation where the …rm has some information concerning the authority’s future
policy and this information is incomplete. Moreover, it is taken into account
that policy changes are more likely to occur under certain economic conditions.
Recent tax debates across Europe introduce a signi…cant source of un-
certainty for potential investors. Although some of the changes result from the
need to unify the EU tax systems, in many cases the policy change can be at-
tributed to the pace of economic growth. The booming Irish economy will face
an increase in corporate tax from a special 10% rate for new foreign manufac-
turing and …nancial investors to 12.5%.23 Other proposals include abandoning
corporate tax exemptions in Germany and withdrawing approximately seventy
tax reliefs used by EU governments use to draw investment.24
We show that the threat of a policy change resulting in a higher (net)
investment cost leads to a reduction in the option value to wait. Consequently,
the …rm invests earlier than in the case of the constant investment cost. The
optimal investment threshold decreases in the magnitude of the change in in-
vestment cost and increases in the market volatility (the latter result also hold
for the Dixit and Pindyck [6] framework). The impact of the trigger value
uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold is non-monotonic. If the un-
certainty is su¢ciently low, then the investment threshold is negatively related
to the trigger value uncertainty. However, a rise in the uncertainty beyond a
certain critical point reverses this relationship and leads to an increase of the
optimal investment threshold.
We use our …ndings to determine the optimal design of a policy change
23”Ireland: Burning Too Bright; Can Ireland control its rapid growth?”, Businessweek, 10
Apr., 2000.
24The tax reliefs subject to change range from Belgian exemptions on multinational head-
quarters to incentives made by Spain for investors in the Basque region. For the details, see
”Hey, Let’s All Get Together and Raise Taxes!”, Businessweek, 25 Nov., 1998.
17that accelerates investment expenditures. There exists a certain (strictly pos-
itive) level of the uncertainty concerning the policy change that triggers the
earliest investment. Hence, a policy maker interested in accelerating investment
should aim at achieving the level of uncertainty, corresponding to this minimal
investment threshold.
Finally, we extend the analysis by considering a case when the size of the
change is stochastic. The uncertainty in the magnitude of the change appears
to mitigate the degree of ’preemption’ so it leads to the outcome which is closer
to the unconditional optimal level.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The implicit solution for the optimal investment
threshold is found by calculating the …rst order condition of (8). Consequently,






























where f (x) =
@F(x)




























¯¡1Ih (after the jump the McDonald-Siegel problem is left), this is
equal to
h(Vs)V 2









what in a straightforward way leads to (12).
In order to prove that (12) is the expression for the maximal value of the





















= ¡(h0 (Vs)Vs + h(Vs))
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¡ (¯ ¡ 1): (25)

















The sign of the …rst component can be determined by notifying that the
lower bound of Vs; denoted by Vs, is a solution to the following equation:






For Vs = Vs the second factor in the …rst component of (25) is equal to zero
and for Vs > Vs it is positive. Therefore the whole expression is surely negative
if (11) holds.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us de…ne the LHS of (12) as a function:
H(Vs;Il;Ih;¯) (28)
= h(Vs)V 2










Di¤erentiating (28) with respect to Il; Ih and ¯, respectively, yields:
@H
@Il
= ¡(Vsh(Vs) + ¯) < 0;
@H
@Ih






























198Il;Ih satisfying 0 < Il < Ih; 8¯ 2 (1;r=®) if ® > 0 and 8¯ 2 (1;1) if ® ￿ 0:
Furthermore, di¤erentiating (28) with respect to Vs gives:
@H
@Vs
= (h0(Vs)Vs + h(Vs))
Ã















+ (¯ ¡ 1):
From the proof of Proposition 1 it is known that under condition (11) @H
@Vs is








what completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. By di¤erentiating (28) with respect to the













The inequality holds since the both factors are positive (cf. (27) and the proof of
(30)). Since @H
@Vs is also positive, from the envelope theorem we directly obtain
the sign of (16).
Proof of Proposition 5. Equation (22) requires the optimal investment
threshold with a deterministic size of the jump be equal to the threshold with a
jump with a stochastic size distributed according to G(Ih): Since the maximiza-
tion problem with a stochastic size of the jump can be expressed as follows:
Ws(V;
_




























the expression for the optimal investment threshold is a slight modi…cation of
(12):
0 = h(Vs)V 2












































what in a straightforward way leads to (22).
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